| Principle | Description | |-----------|-------------| | No central authority | No root CAs or registration bodies. | | Append-only log | Once a key is published, it cannot be deleted (only superseded). | | Transparency | Anyone can monitor the log for misbehavior. | | Gossip-based auditing | Clients periodically check with random peers for log consistency. | | Self-attestation | No third-party vouching; trust is built via out-of-band verification. |
| Feature | Traditional PKI (X.509) | Pubki | Blockchain PKI (e.g., Namecoin) | |---------|------------------------|-------|----------------------------------| | Trust model | Hierarchical CAs | Decentralized, gossip | Decentralized, consensus | | Removal | Revocation lists | Append-only (no delete) | Immutable | | Lookup speed | Fast (DNS+CRL/OCSP) | Moderate (Merkle proof) | Slow (block confirmations) | | Sybil resistance | Weak (any CA can issue) | None (relies on external trust) | Strong (proof-of-work/stake) | | Anonymity | Low (identities in certs) | Pseudonymous (user_id can be hash) | Pseudonymous |
But wait. How do you know the person handing you the "Public Key" is actually the bank? A hacker could stand in the middle of the digital road, hand you their public key, and pretend to be your bank. You lock your secrets in the box and hand it to them, thinking it’s safe. They open it with their private key and steal everything.
This is where the "Infrastructure" part of PKI comes in—the Digital Notary.
✅ Yes, if:
❌ No, if:
If an attacker steals a private key but does not immediately use it, standard pubki monitoring might miss it. Regular key rotation and post-quantum cryptography readiness are emerging requirements.
A server might present a valid certificate, but if the intermediate CA certificate is missing or expired, clients will reject the connection. Proper pubki work includes bundling full certificate chains.
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Pubki Work ● [ FAST ]
| Principle | Description | |-----------|-------------| | No central authority | No root CAs or registration bodies. | | Append-only log | Once a key is published, it cannot be deleted (only superseded). | | Transparency | Anyone can monitor the log for misbehavior. | | Gossip-based auditing | Clients periodically check with random peers for log consistency. | | Self-attestation | No third-party vouching; trust is built via out-of-band verification. |
| Feature | Traditional PKI (X.509) | Pubki | Blockchain PKI (e.g., Namecoin) | |---------|------------------------|-------|----------------------------------| | Trust model | Hierarchical CAs | Decentralized, gossip | Decentralized, consensus | | Removal | Revocation lists | Append-only (no delete) | Immutable | | Lookup speed | Fast (DNS+CRL/OCSP) | Moderate (Merkle proof) | Slow (block confirmations) | | Sybil resistance | Weak (any CA can issue) | None (relies on external trust) | Strong (proof-of-work/stake) | | Anonymity | Low (identities in certs) | Pseudonymous (user_id can be hash) | Pseudonymous |
But wait. How do you know the person handing you the "Public Key" is actually the bank? A hacker could stand in the middle of the digital road, hand you their public key, and pretend to be your bank. You lock your secrets in the box and hand it to them, thinking it’s safe. They open it with their private key and steal everything. pubki work
This is where the "Infrastructure" part of PKI comes in—the Digital Notary.
✅ Yes, if:
❌ No, if:
If an attacker steals a private key but does not immediately use it, standard pubki monitoring might miss it. Regular key rotation and post-quantum cryptography readiness are emerging requirements. | Principle | Description | |-----------|-------------| | No
A server might present a valid certificate, but if the intermediate CA certificate is missing or expired, clients will reject the connection. Proper pubki work includes bundling full certificate chains.